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The Report of Infrastructure Australia (IA) to the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) 
http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/files/A_Report_to_the_Council_of_Australian
_Governments.pdf comes at a once-in-a-lifetime combination of: large accumulations of 
public tax receipts and large accumulations of private savings in superannuation funds, 
together with a general public unease about their wealth and the future of the economy.  
Handled appropriately these circumstances provide the political will to undertake a new 
round of economic development through infrastructure investment.   
The IA Report to COAG reflects this.  It outlines an approach that contains many of the 
new elements needed to achieve such a goal and points to many existing initiatives that 
are underway.  However taken in the broad, the existing situation in Australia is 
reminiscent of that in many developing countries where formal organizational 
arrangements for the supply of infrastructure services present a logical framework but 
where the actual institutional arrangements and their application are less than efficient.  
The term “institutional arrangements” is used to cover all parts of the service provision 
process from formal organizational arrangements through all the interrelationships of 
the services with other parts of the economy.  
There is much to applaud in the IA Report including the early statement of the primary 
goal of establishing “A new national approach to infrastructure decision making”.  
Many of the shortcomings of infrastructure service provision in Australia reflect the 
neglect of the decision making process which many times has resulted in diffusion of 
authority and responsibility across many levels of government  causing delays and 
misallocation of resources often more in response to short term political ends rather than 
long term economic development goals. 
Much of the following commentary is based on direct involvement with policy 
formation and application with the World Bank Group and in private sector 
participation in the supply of infrastructure services.  The focus on the four major 
networked infrastructure service sectors of energy, transport, communications and water 
reflects a broadly held view of these sectors as the foundations of a strong economy.  
The need for high discipline in all aspects of the decision making process including 
rigorous product definition, is clearly accepted in IA and the Commonwealth 
government.  What is less clearly accepted is the need for new forms of institutional 
power to provide the leverage for change in the existing institutional arrangements.  A 
hallmark of the World Bank’s success in infrastructure was and is its use of loan 
arrangements conditioned by scheduled changes in everything from axle load limits on 
roads and metering and pricing water consumption to reorganization of relevant 
ministries.  The long term economics of infrastructure are characterized by the need for 
ongoing financial flows into investments and back from the community that loan 
arrangements provide compared with the indiscipline of grant arrangements. 
This commentary generally follows the structure of the IA Report.  It uses many 
concepts that have firm foundations in political welfare economics but lower acceptance 
and popularity in current political and corporate thinking which is more closely aligned 
to financial economics.  As a “Working Paper” the explanation of these concepts is brief 
but their general meaning legitimacy and contribution is hopefully clear. 
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1 National approach to infrastructure decision making 
The process of formulating a report such as this is well understood with its features that 
include a terms of reference within the comfort zone of political masters and exhaustive 
public consultation.  To counteract this tendency the legislation establishing IA is 
delightfully broad enough to allow the Report and this commentary to venture outside 
the existing framework of institutional arrangements beginning with commentary on the 
limits of the current framework as reflected in the Report. 
1.1 Limits of the Part 1 framework 
1.1.1 National significance 
One of the enduring concepts behind discussion of infrastructure investment as a 
contribution to Australia’s economic development is that the impact of such 
development is measured in terms of external accounts.  It follows but is rarely 
explicitly observed that the focus should therefore be only on infrastructure that directly 
supports international economic activity.  Clearly this is not rationally so and for IA to 
use the implied definition of national significance that aligns it with external economic 
exchange is a severe restriction on its pursuit of the goal of economic development.   
Consequently the topic of infrastructure service provision in the Report’s four selected 
sectors of energy, transport, water and telecommunications should be explicitly defined 
as economy wide. 
1.1.2 Project approach based on problem solving 
The improvement of the decision making process on infrastructure begs the question of 
what is the focus or product of this decision making.  The answer in the Report and 
more broadly in the community is “projects”.  However this is not correct in economic 
(development) terms where it is the services flowing from the infrastructure that is the 
real product.  This accords with the need for a long term view of what is efficient 
infrastructure and adjusts the terms of discussion away from construction to the full 
gamut of construction operations and maintenance (whole of life) of the service. 
Also to focus on a “problem solving” approach suggests that the desired infrastructure 
services and institutional arrangements for supplying them for long term economic 
growth are well known and accepted – but there are some existing gaps or “problems”.  
It is clear that currently there is a need for swift investment flows to mitigate the impact 
of a contracting economy but it would be useful for IA to begin at the same time as 
identifying projects to be funded, a broader discussion of the underlying economic 
development strategy and infrastructure services role in it. 
1.1.3 Mixture of political/social concerns with economic efficiency and with 
environmental concerns 
The stated focus on decision making requires discipline in defining which decision 
making we plan to improve.  Infrastructure investment decisions are always the result of 
seeking to fulfill a combination of economic (mainly financial) efficiency goals and 
political goals.  In a representative democratic system politicians set the political goals 
and allocate funds from the general tax base for such infrastructure, and professional 
experts in the relevant field are charged by society in providing advice that quantifies 
costs and benefits of resource allocation for efficiency gains (usually cost reductions) as 
well as those for political goals.   
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Discipline around assessment of costs and benefits of environmental concerns also 
exhibits a combination of expert professional concern with efficiency (long term) 
interspersed with politically driven activity which views any change in natural systems 
as too costly.  Conceptually the process of analysis generally labeled Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) is a sound way of combining many areas of concern including 
economics.  In practice the way in which power or discretion over the decision making 
process is distributed equally among areas of interest creates major problems.   This is 
not difficult to overcome and are worthy of IA’s attention. 
In terms of IA’s desirable role in decision making it would appear to be closer to the 
expert efficiency end rather than the political end.  And yet it occasionally appears to go 
beyond the expert profile to become a political advocate for political inspired 
investment (which the writer supports politically), for example, in both rural and 
regional, and indigenous development and some environmental issues.   
1.1.4 Cost benefit analysis: Purpose & limits including intersectoral 
In the political economic discussion in Australia and elsewhere the logical foundations 
of cost benefit analysis (CBA) have been stretched often in the EIA process to 
encompass its application to a range of decision making way beyond what can be 
supported.  CBA’s primary legitimacy rests in ranking alternate options for investment 
in projects of a similar characteristics, size and longevity.  Input-output analysis has 
allowed some extension of CBA to intersectoral impacts of investment in dissimilar 
investment options but collection of the data and its analysis is costly and fraught with 
problems.  This has not restricted governments from making wild statements about the 
multiplier effects in support for some investments but Australia through IA deserves 
better. 
1.1.5 Confusion re competition, markets, public & private sector roles 
A fundamental issue in the discussion of topics covered in the Report is the confusion 
about the nature and roles of competition, markets, and the roles of the public and 
private sectors.   
In this commentary and elsewhere in economics the term “market” is used to refer to 
resource exchange where there are many participants demanding and supplying 
products that are broadly similar.   Consequently “competition” or competitive 
tendering is not the same as a market although a market includes much competition 
among the entities involved.   
Similarly at the level of disciplined discussion desired for IA, the roles and 
characteristics of the public and private sectors need more sophisticated use than the 
broad inference that the public sector is inefficient and bad, and private sector efficient 
and good. Already we use combinations of public sector and private sector roles that 
take many forms, suggesting that a broader dialogue that goes to the issue of appropriate 
governance (decision making control) structures commented upon below. 
1.1.6 Need for sector analysis approach 
Much of the above comment on the limits of the current discussion of investment in 
infrastructure services would begin to be overcome by the introduction of what the 
World Bank terms “Sector Analysis”.  Sector analysis will be described more fully later 
in this paper but to understand its relevance it incorporates much of what is discussed in 
the Report as Nationwide Infrastructure Challenges but goes beyond them to ensure 
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cognition of the interconnectedness of many sectoral policy settings, including policies 
on the level of investment. 
2 Nationwide infrastructure challenges 
Many of the challenges facing the delivery of infrastructure services in different parts of 
Australia are similar and in that sense they are national issues.  But the delivery of the 
service product has different characteristics in different parts of Australia and for 
different demands.  The complication that policy makers struggle with is that many of 
the services are physically connected in networks and/or economically connected as 
inputs to other products suggesting that our institutional arrangements should reflect this 
dependency by being themselves more appropriately interconnected. 
This duality between low scale products needing, for efficiency, to be tailored to local 
demand, and higher scale connected products needing to contain many standardized 
elements is manageable using the organizational concepts of Self Organizing 
Hierarchical Order (SOHO) whereby high scale organizations dictate rules to lower 
level organizations who are free to operate within those rule frameworks to meet locally 
specific demands and who in turn feedback to higher levels to inform the evolution of 
higher level rules.  It is an axiom of economic development that growth occurs largely 
through differentiation of products to meet specific needs.  So to move to uniformity by 
requiring the same approach nationally on all issues misses large opportunities for 
economic development. 
The challenge is that currently the three tiers of government (and their borders) that 
dominate decision making on infrastructure rarely coincide with the physical boundaries 
of concentrations of demand for infrastructure service.  For example, transport has 
urban sub-metropolitan demands for service, and then metropolitan, and then regional, 
then national levels of demand, that only occasionally coincide with political 
boundaries.  This issue is at the centre of the pursuit of better governance. 
2.1 Better governance 
Comments have already been made about the need to define the product of 
infrastructure as the service delivered and that infrastructure service products have 
different demand and supply characteristics, for example, the scale of the demand 
catchment for a general cargo port is different to the scale of demand for urban 
transport.  And yet they are interconnected through the impact that freight transport has 
on both systems. 
Similarly the transport product demand met by road and rail is currently in popular 
public discussion seen as market competition between organizations requiring different 
forms of governance.  However for the urban transport product they are just different 
ways of meeting the same demand for service and should be under the same governance 
structure. 
Again the urban road rail competition does not constitute a market.  As has been 
discussed elsewhere (Stone 2008)i from a decision making process point of view urban 
transport infrastructure service provision should logically be provided under a single 
governance structure that reflects the monopoly nature of the service and the dominance 
of the network of rights of way in the cost of provision. 
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As an efficiency goal for IA governance concern, the SOHO form of organization 
would solve many existing problems.  Without getting into too much detail the SOHO 
structure unlike the military hierarchical top down centralized control, allows control to 
flow both ways.  Representatives from the lowest scale level, say urban transport, would 
be represented on the next level up say regional and so on up to national.  That way 
when a higher level service is being considered say an investment in an international 
airport then local concern say for noise would have a hearing as would the regional and 
national economic importance in a governance structure process with the power and 
legitimacy to make the tradeoffs between competing concerns.  This is a much more 
efficient and fair decision making process driven in part by the property rights behind 
accessibility as well as political rights.  This is in contrast to the default policy to 
uniformly increase centralization and standardization with power over decision making 
residing in the exercise of political rights.  Again this is so because the efficiency of 
markets is largely based on exchange of property rights over resources and not political 
rights even though the later has residual responsibilities and rights to ensure free and 
open markets do not create unacceptable distortions in who benefits.  The later is 
particularly true in regard to infrastructure services which, more often than not, have 
monopoly characteristics. 
2.2 Creating competitive markets 
As previously noted the characteristics of efficient markets include competition amongst 
entities on both sides of exchange of resources but importantly requires many entities to 
be participating.  In the market for infrastructure services many entities compete to 
supply various inputs but there is a need for clarity in defining which product inputs 
have the potential for supply that markets can make efficient and which products are 
closer to being monopoly inputs given the constraints on supply.  With this in mind the 
Reports assertions on creating competitive markets needs expansion for clarification. 
On energy the focus on development of a high capacity national grid mistakes its 
physical and economic nature.  To gain a perspective it is estimated that in the USA 
around 40% of the cost of electricity delivery from generation to point of use is in the 
cost and losses of the grid ii.  In Australia with a less dense pattern of energy use and a 
more linear grid network (as compared to grids with a more uniform spatial pattern as in 
the USA and Europe) the cost may be considerably higher.  And yet discussion in the 
Report proceeds as if location of the generation unit as compared to the location of use 
is not an important factor except that completion and development of the grid is 
essential to allowing competitive markets for generation to develop.  Grids are 
important for redundancy and hence reliability of supply but not at a level where all 
generators can bid for supply with little constraint imposed by transmission costs. 
The development of an economic competitive market for electricity requires that 
investment options be considered that compare generation and transmission costs of 
various sizes, locations and technologies and reliability for supply to entities demanding 
service of various sizes, etcetera, various locations.   To truncate that decision making 
into a plan to develop and complete a national grid is not a path to efficiency. 
On communications careful assessment of the inputs for service delivery yield a very 
different profile from the one used in the Report where again the jump is made to a 
belief that efficiency will come from competition between complete packages of service 
delivery that include content and accessibility through physical networks owned and 
operated by each supplier.  Transmission technology suggests that fiber-optic cable 
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provides the most efficient transmission with little cost constraint on providing high 
capacity.  Consequently any duplication of networks simply increases the transmission 
cost of service delivery by a factor close to the number of networks.  Service suppliers 
want their own networks simply to provide control especially where as in the Telstra 
copper network case, they are required to give regulated access to other service 
providers.   For Australia to have more than one telecommunications network is 
economic stupidity.  An analogous situation confronted member banks in the early days 
of credit cards where the costs of each supplier processing transactions became 
crippling.   The situation was resolved with the formation of the company called VISA 
which has many users who compete on a level playing field on service features other 
than transmission cost and control.  This situation should not be confused with 
political/social initiatives to subsidize service delivery to groups disadvantaged by 
location (rural/regional) or social circumstance.  The only proviso rarely acted upon, is 
to make such transfers completely transparent to the whole community.   
Water infrastructure services have an abundance of physical constrains arising from 
rainfall patterns, catchment characteristics and linkages, and location of point of use.  
These lend themselves to governance structures of the SOHO type that for efficiency 
should include again careful definition of products at different scales and a closing of 
the connection between investment cost and user charges.  This is a more complex topic 
than can be covered in the working paper, but well established forms of institutional 
arrangements would remove the current pricing distortions that have arisen through lack 
of understanding that required politicization of the process of water resource exchange 
where property rights to water were distributed well beyond their long term and reliable 
availability. 
Again on transport there is a paramount need to move to a definition of transport that is 
demand driven, namely the delivery of transport services, rather than the historically 
founded supply definition that has resulted, in economic development terms, in the 
nonsensical call for competition among modes.  The transport “service” definition rather 
than an investment project definition would highlight the distinctive cost functions for 
various modes of supply which despite the calls for competitive markets rarely overlap 
when particular services are analyzed.  For example high speed rail has distinct cost 
advantages when there is high demand for long haul service as in the mineral export 
industry but not in the intercity passenger market unless road and airways are congested.   
2.3 One economy, one set of rules 
The position reflected in this area of general discussion is easy to accept provided we 
are all holding the same position.  But given the importance of such a general 
proposition high discipline and more detailed description is call for to ensure clarity.  As 
already commented much economic growth comes from disaggregation of the economy 
to suit local demand and supply which is not uniform across the economy.  What 
undoubtedly should be uniform are the physical rules and procedures that the Report 
advocates.  The COAG transport reforms are examples of this and they are also 
examples of the need for leverage (power) to be established that would force along the 
speed of their adoption by the States.   
The push behind the “one economy” label is surely to recognize the interconnectedness 
of the cells in the infrastructure service networks and again the need for SOHO type 
institutional arrangements that distinguish between the need for uniform 
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physical/procedural rules and the need for responsiveness to the local characteristics of 
demand.   
On specific sectors the comments on the need to carefully interpret the role of 
competition in seeking the efficiency available from true markets are applicable here.   
2.4 Existing infrastructure 
Of the keys to improving the contribution to the economy of existing infrastructure 
services listed in the Report, the use of increased productivity and increased 
employment are examples of generalities that everyone one will support.  What needs to 
be asked in reviewing a Report of this nature is “what is their operational significance?”  
Both measures are the result of many other interventions and are notorious for their 
definitional and data collection problems.  Given the operational focus of IA 
particularly on improving the decision making in the provision of infrastructure 
(service), discipline calls for the description of how each improvement in infrastructure 
service would contribute to increases in productivity and employment. 
The call for open access to monopoly infrastructure networks again needs to be 
interpreted as a challenge to improve the institutional arrangements for control which is 
wrapped into the area we now call governance.   
The institutional arrangements for pricing are also nominated as a key to improvement.  
In economic development terms again the need is to carefully define the product being 
exchanged and hence priced.  For example, the cost of access to the transport network 
should be the most significant price presented to the user.  Economically once an 
investment in service is made, maximization of economic benefit from it comes from 
allowing use without a charge at the time of use until congestion occurs at which time 
user charges should reflect the economically well established principles of temporal 
marginal cost pricing.  Of course the economic benefit of this all depends on users 
having already been charged for access to the network of rights of way and the facilities 
therein. 
2.5 Climate change 
From an economic point of view the climate change issue in assessing infrastructure 
investment is simply one of internalizing costs that have been largely external up to this 
point of time.  The most effective way of doing that in the past has been to establish 
limits (caps) which impose costs that can then be minimized through technological and 
production innovation.  In the current situation in Australia the Commonwealth’s 
approach is to establish an emissions trading market.  The focus on establishing such a 
market and granting existing emitters free rights to trade or keep has diverted the 
discussion from focusing on the setting of the limit and ultimately its price.  An 
alternate approach based on experience of appropriate pricing at desired limits would 
impose carbon emission costs as a tax.  The transaction costs of internalizing carbon 
costs with a uniform tax per ton of carbon would be much lower and involve fewer 
distortions (picking winners and losers).  Economically it is the same as imposing seat 
belt, noise and emission controls on vehicles. 
The inclusion in the Report of a discussion on energy security and peak oil provides an 
opportunity to comment on the limits of modeling techniques used to quantity such 
issues.  The statistical relationships that underlie most of these models ensure that their 
predictions are in the form of projections of existing states and relationships rather than 
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forecasts of future states that embody fundamental change mostly in technology but also 
in the communities tastes and preference that mould the way goods and services are 
valued. As such much of this modeling is deeply flawed conceptually. 
In regard to the Reports coverage of renewable energy, the national grid carbon capture, 
and issues such as energy intensity of various modes for meeting the passenger and 
freight tasks, need for analytical disciple in evaluating alternatives, is all clear.  
Similarly the primacy of economic analysis in bringing all the different ways of analysis 
together to guide decision making over the allocation of resources to alternative 
infrastructure services is clear but it is unusual not to frame the analysis as 
Environmental Impact Analysis using the concepts of economics. 
In this frame the legitimacy of the place of investment in carbon capture in national 
infrastructure service development is hard to see.  However its legitimacy in support of 
export activity in the coal trade is clear but it should be transparently identified in that 
category. 
3 Location specific infrastructure challenges 
As has been noted above the location specifics of infrastructure are an important 
descriptor of the form and scale of the service product they are delivering.  The 
categorization used in the Report to describe challenges nods in that direction but can be 
improved again with a disciplined approach consistent with product definition that 
reflects the physical constraints on service demand and supply.  Physical mapping of the 
infrastructure locations by sector and type, as would be a part of Sector Analysis, would 
improve decision making by clarifying the nature of decision making process required 
for each infrastructure product. 
Despite the absence of the Sector Analysis framework, some comments using the 
Report framework may be useful for future development. 
3.1 Cities 
On cities, The Report recognizes their importance and infrastructure’s role in the 
efficiency of their economy.  However it would be more responsible for economic 
development to use evidence based information as for example, in urban transport 
where on public transport systems the costs of rail metros is so high as to rationally rule 
them out from consideration for new networks.  Fully developed bus rapid transport 
delivers service at the cost per passenger kilometer as rail based metroiii. 
Similarly the comment on a conflict between sustainability and affordability in housing 
and associated infrastructure serviced land betrays a lack of comprehension of both the 
sustainability concept and the origins of much that establishes land value in the 
available services to which particular land has access.   
An axiom of economic development is that policies (economies) are not sustainable 
unless the goods and services, including infrastructure, are affordable to the community.  
So there is no conflict between sustainability and affordability only a clear principal in 
service delivery of the need to supply services at costs the community can afford. 
The reference in this section of the Report to sewer mining and public vs private 
provision provides an opportunity to raise the use of publicly held property rights that is 
part of all public infrastructure systems.  These community collective property rights are 
often referred to as the “commons”.  To argue that the private sector proponent has 
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intellectual property rights over the idea through its proposed specific application is 
absurd.  Sewer mining or reuse of effluent is a well known process and any specific 
application will use the effluent input over which the upstream community has invested 
private and public (commons) property rights to present the opportunity.  The 
community property rights far exceed the property rights of the “good idea opportunity” 
claimed by a proponent.  This is not to say efficient inputs to “sewer mining” can not be 
provided by the private sector from existing competitive markets.   
There is undoubtedly a cultural as distinct to a scientific challenge in the reuse of water 
and its solution would appear to lie in redesign of the governance arrangements (and 
hence investment/price of use) to shorten the connection between demand and supply to 
prevent users believing they can call on some remote entity such as the Commonwealth 
to subsidize the cost of their infrastructure services.  
Bound up in a lot of the infrastructure challenges in Australia is the role and work 
practices of the existing labor force.  Throughout the world large networked 
infrastructure services have employed large numbers of labor as demanded by early 
technologies as in rail.  Modern service provision including in rail requires different 
processes and fewer employees.  Strategies are required to change processes and to 
manage the reduction while supporting the dismissed work force.  Such strategies are 
often as important as the selection of new capital works projects.  This is not a new 
problem in development and the example of Spanish Railways transformation in the 
nineteen seventies under World Bank leverage is relevant, particularly in New South 
Wales.  The solution to improving urban rail service in Sydney of building a metro 
system separate from the existing organization is a “banana republic” response to the 
problem.  It is plainly in the interest of organized labor to secure the future of public 
transport infrastructure services and their role in it by participating.  In Spain the 
development experts of the World Bank required the rail organization owned by the 
Government to invest in the financing of retraining relocation and redundancy payments 
for the work force to bring it in line with efficient levels of staffing for Spanish 
conditions as part of the Loan Agreement. 
3.2 Exports 
The Report’s section on boosting exports raises several of the issues that need 
addressing for Australia and its infrastructure service base to move to a higher level of 
efficiency.  
The first of these issues applicable to both sea ports and airports is the need for new 
institutional arrangements, particularly the organizational governance arrangements that 
reflect the scale of these products.  They are mostly regional and national rather than 
local and need controls over decision making at that scale.  Again SOHO style 
arrangements would ensure local representation at regional and consequently national 
levels to allow them higher decision making discretion over these services than the 
discretion that local level exercises under current arrangements that give control to local 
communities dominated by local concerns, the “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) 
syndrome. 
This section of the Report also reflects the “default” view that 
competition/markets/private sector/centralization (nationalization), and in the case of 
freight that the “rail” approach is good – anything else not so good.  As discussed above 
the removal of “bottleneck” problems is only part of the story and broader sector issues 
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such as organizational forms that are not private corporate or public corporate should be 
explored. 
3.3 Indigenous communities 
The concern for indigenous communities is the result of expression of a political 
concern that is strongly supported by the broad community and the author.  However 
the use of racial determinant by IA as an expert technical group dilutes the putative 
power of IA to improve infrastructure services to all.   
Again others have dealt with the issues and in the example of the World Bank it was 
covered in the introduction of an emphasis on the rural and urban poverty issue that 
proved to be an effective target for economic development without shifting into the 
political arena.  This is not to say that IA should not be responsive in a transparent 
manner to a political dictate.  But this should not confuse the pursuit of its primary 
purpose of advising on economic efficiency in the provision of infrastructure services. 
3.4 Rural & regional communities 
Again the promotion of the simplistic view that economic development is driven purely 
by direct external account (export) economic activity reduces the effectiveness of IA.  
External economic activity is dependant on internal activity and vice versa.   
In all discussions about rural and regional community development issues IA has the 
opportunity to lead the discussion in the direction of economic development with social 
issues discussed in that context to provide a clear economic cost benefit perspective for 
resource allocation decision making rather than the current confused mixture. 
Only then will discussion of such issues as national electricity and gas grids, and 
broadband networks including such policies as the universal service obligation be put in 
proper perspective.  To be clear this comment is not a criticism of such social political 
policies but a call for better analysis and transparency regarding the economic 
consequences of such resource allocation. 
4 Meeting the challenges 
Based on the above comments it should be clear that the themes, project proposals, and 
priority list are viewed as a good beginning but that there is a substantial opportunity in 
the future to move to a level of analysis that would be more supportive of economic 
development and particularly the improvement of the decision making processes 
involved.  As such commentary in the next three sections will be restricted however the 
fourth section on Financing raises issues that deserve additional discussion. 
4.1 Themes 
The themes listed suffer form the perception of their resulting from the IA “picking 
winners” with all of the associated baggage of that political approach.  Again much of 
this could be dismissed if themes selection would have been provided with sectoral 
analytical justification against economic development goals. 
4.2 Project proposals 
The list of project proposals is presented in the context of being based on using 
responses to the call for suggestions from interested parties.  While this is flattering to 
interested parties it is misleading in regard to the level of expertise and motivations 
10 
Commentary on the Report to COAG by Infrastructure Australia 
Stone 
 
behind the proposals which vary considerably.  An ongoing dialogue around the 
framework of sectoral analysis would improve this situation.  
Again given IA’s commentary on the absence and/or level of cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) the limits of CBA and admonitions as value for money need to be more 
explicitly recognized.  To go from using the legitimate conceptual framework of 
considering all forms of costs and benefits of alternative investments to guide political 
decision making to monetizing costs and benefits of “good idea” proposals as some 
form of absolute measure of economic justification, goes way beyond the legitimate 
sectoral confined monetized (even shadow priced) application of CBA.   
The IA methodology framework includes many general attributes such as strategic fit 
that could be the same as for sectoral analysis but brevity of presentation leaves 
uncertainty.  As with most government backed reports in Australia there is an absence 
of analysis of desirable changes to institutional arrangements required beyond the 
generalization of the default move towards centralization/private sector. The analysis of 
strategic fit is an indication of recognition of need but further methodological 
development and disciplined application is required. 
The short term economic challenges of the world wide credit crunch call for prompt 
action to stimulate the contracting economy.  These circumstances can be compared 
again with the World Bank’s experience applying the “Reconstruction” mandate of its 
full title.  The analytical framework used for such loans was conceptually grounded in 
sector analytical thinking without the high level of quantification typically used in the 
normal course of the World Bank’s lending program. 
The bottom line is a need to emphasize the grounding and sourcing of strategy and 
resource allocation (investment) guidance from expert analysis not laundry/white board 
lists drawn from narrow issue promoters. 
4.3 Priority list 
The scheduled issuance of a Priority List of infrastructure projects in March 2009 
provides an important opportunity to set in place the beginning of the type of broad 
contextual strategic framework of Sector Analysis. 
4.4 Financing 
The discussion in the Report is focused on new project investment funding when it 
should be broadened to cover all public infrastructure services funding from investment 
through operations and maintenance – and the source(s) of revenue to provide these 
funds.  The proposed establishment of funding decision making framework hopefully 
heads in that broader direction.  And unusually and importantly there is reference to the 
asset value of existing infrastructure which is another necessary element in considering 
finance. 
As in all aspects of infrastructure service provision this section is limited by a naive 
view of what constitutes an efficient market and the role of competition in sustaining 
such markets.  It is also limited by the simplistic categorization of control of supply as 
either coming from public or private sectors when the scale of many of the 
infrastructure service products (networks) calls for organizational designs that are 
somewhere in between pure public and pure private and which reflect aspects of co-
operatives and mutual corporate structures, often involving the ownership of property 
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rights over land as the means of allocating discretion over the control of investment 
decision making. 
To again emphasize the market/competition distinctions consider the following 
example. In a procurement process to select a consortium to provide service from a new 
link in an urban transport network, say we have three consortium members with one 
each from finance, design and construct, and operations and maintenance. Individual 
members operate in competitive markets with say five participants.  Then, all else being 
equal the chance of any one member of the winning consortium being the “best” in 
efficiency for this market is one in five.  The chance of the winning consortium having 
all three “best” members is one in one hundred and twenty five or 0.08%.  If 
procurement had been divided into three processes focused on each of the competitive 
markets the in each case the probability of the “best” selection is one in one or 100%.  
Hence while current procurement processes leading to public private partnerships may 
be competitive, they do not constitute a competitive market and are a long way from 
optimal. 
The solution again lies in a more accurate definition of products and sourcing inputs 
from competitive markets with connectivity (or management of inputs) between the 
different scales of service product achieved by new institutional arrangements based on 
SOHO principles.   
In finance the development of a broader market, based on the creditworthiness of 
infrastructure service products in any say individual region, supported by the existing 
asset base would generate a much needed long term bond market in Australia to meet 
the needs and long term profile of both economic development and the superannuation 
industry. 
In considering the level of government or existing administration of funding sources it 
is economically rational to consider the efficiency of each of the categories of supply of 
these sources namely taxes and user charges including congestion charges.  Enough is 
known about the relationship (amount and timing) between users and supply to be able 
to establish the framework of an efficient market where pricing signals direct the 
demand/supply equation to an efficient relationship.  The long term/short term 
variability of the cost of different inputs requires the use of financial engineering but the 
tools to do so are available and the benefits large.  The challenge is significant with this 
issue as it overlaps the perennial problem of vertical financial imbalances between 
Commonwealth and States. 
Again at the level of thinking addressed by the Report, the potential of the use of the 
link between financing instruments and changes in institutional arrangements should be 
discussed.  Again from World Bank experience it can be politically advantageous to use 
an independent institution such as IA to shift blame/power from politically unacceptable 
to necessary to get finance for improved services and conditions of use. 
The long term role of IA and Build Australia fund defines a need over the long term for 
financial arrangements that would cover construction maintenance and operations to 
ensure the efficient supply of infrastructure services.  Hence the need to recycle 
investment finance through loan arrangements serviced by appropriate pricing (user 
charges) rather than tax funded grants for capital works should be discussed.  This 
observation again highlights the shortcomings of the “project” approach compared to 
the long term “service” approach. 
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5 Looking ahead 
5.1 World Bank approach to infrastructure development 
As noted above the majority of the issues discussed above could effectively be 
consolidated using what the World Bank has called Sector Analysis.  Such analysis 
provides a whole of government mechanism for formulating and monitoring relevant 
policies and strategies for the public infrastructure services discussed in the Report.  It 
also provides a clear location of responsibility for such matters.  To quote from a 1985 
publication of the World Bankiv: 
“Sector analysis, broadly defined, is concerned with the examination and assessment of the 
resources, needs, problems, and opportunities in individual sectors of the economy, for the 
purposes of 
• Assisting consideration of economy wide policies and strategies 
• Enabling judgments to be made on sector development policies and strategies 
that will enhance the contribution of the sector to the country’s (state’s) 
economic development 
• Determining investment policies in the sector as a crucial step towards 
identifying specific projects and any additional pre-investment studies required 
• Evaluating the capacity of principal institutions in the sector to implement 
desired policies, programs, and projects.”  
Much of the analysis that is required already exists in various guises and labels and at 
different scales in the States and Commonwealth.  For example, a transport sector 
analysis would provide a clear strategic context for mechanisms such as New South 
Wales State Infrastructure Strategic Plan and Gateway Review under the authority of 
the infrastructure finance and cabinet budget committees, providing a clear and 
disciplined analytical foundation than is presently not evident. 
Sector analysis includes collection of appropriate statistics including on assets, their 
capacities and usage.  It should be set up as an ongoing process of focused concise 
studies aimed at improving decision making processes and to build sectoral 
understanding for senior decision makers with considerable knowledge of the sector.   
Equally, responsibility for sector analysis should be located organizationally at the level 
with the leverage and power that comes with control of resource allocation to 
implement decisions on resource allocation to deliver service products.  Again the use 
of SOHO structure in each sector, e.g. in water from catchment through regional river 
basin to national, is required to achieve this. 
Experience has shown that it is the process and learning approach in sector analysis that 
is important to improving decision making rather than a massive one off effort the 
results of which are usually ignored. 
6 Conclusion 
The opportunity presented to IA by the confluence of economic challenges and 
relatively large accumulations of savings by the Commonwealth and the mandatory 
superannuation savings of the general public needs to be grasped.  The Report to COAG 
is a good start and the primacy of references to improving decision making most 
encouraging.  As commented throughout this paper extension of the thinking behind the 
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report to a concern with the institutional arrangements that guide the decision making 
processes in the provision of public infrastructure services would provide the 
foundations for moving ahead.   
 
                                            
i Stone A “Institutional Reform: A Decision-making Process View” Elsevier Research in Transport Economics XXX (2008) 1-15. 
ii Lovins A “Small is Profitable: The hidden economic benefits of making energy resources the right size” 2002 
iii A broad introduction to the issues of comparative costs and capacity for similar level of service in urban areas can be found in 
Hensher D A “Sustainable Transport Systems: moving towards a value for money and network based approach and away from 
blind commitment”. Transport Policy 14, 2007, 98-102 
iv One of the better general descriptions of the Word Bank’s approach is to be found in Baum, Warren C. Investing in Development 
(1985) Ch 5, 11, 12. A more recent perspective that shares some of the problems discussed in this paper can be seen in the 
World Bank publication (2002): Cities on the Move: A world Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review; IBSN 0-8213-5148-6 Ch 2, 10 
& 11. 
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